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CASENOTES 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DIS-
COVERY RULE DENIES PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 
PERIOD BECAUSE KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS RAISING THE IN-
QUIRY SATISFIES ACTUAL NOTICE REQUIREMENT. Lutheran 
Hospital v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 (1985). 
A patient experienced continuing pain and discomfort following 
treatment for a broken ankle at a hospital.' Three months after complet-
ing treatment at the hospital, the patient sought treatment for the ankle 
pain from another physician2 but did not seek legal advice until a year 
later.3 Patient's counsel requested x-rays and medical records from the 
hospital4 but the x-rays that revealed the hospital's negligence5 were not 
received until a second request was made two years later.6 Finally, five 
years after the original treatment, the patient filed a complaint alleging 
medical malpractice.7 The trial judge allowed a jury verdict of $258,000 
in spite of the statute of limitations defense raised by the hospital, and the 
hospital appealed. 8 The court of special appeals reversed,9 holding that 
1. Lutheran Hosp. v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227,482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 (1985). Ms. Levy was discharged from Lutheran Hospital in 
February 1974, after being told by the hospital physician to throwaway her 
crutches, buy orthopedic shoes, and walk on the ankle. Id. at 233, 482 A.2d at 25. 
2. In April, 1974, Dr. Weidmann at Mercy Hospital said that Ms. Levy's ankle "was 
all messed up," and asked her "[w]ho the hell told you to walk on that ankle?" Id. 
3. Id. at 234, 482 A.2d at 26. Ms. Levy learned of the possibility of legal action 
through a chance conversation at a department store. She then discussed the claim 
with a Baltimore City lawyer who gave no advice but requested $50.00. It was not 
until April 22, 1975, that Ms. Levy actually retained a Baltimore County lawyer. 
Id. 
4. Id. Ms. Levy's Baltimore County counsel requested records and x-rays on May 2, 
1975. 
5. Id. Dr. Decker, the patient's treating physician, examined the x-rays and rendered 
an opinion that the hospital improperly treated the patient. Id. 
6. The medical records and x-ray reports were produced immediately but the x-ray 
films were not supplied until January 1977. Id. 
7. Id. Because treatment by the hospital occurred prior to 1976, the Health Claims 
Arbitration provision of MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-OI-09 (1984) 
was inapplicable. After July 1, 1976, all medical malpractice claims were required 
to be heard by an arbitration panel of a layman, a doctor, and a lawyer before suit 
could be brought in the circuit court. 
8. 60 Md. App. at 231-32, 482 A.2d at 25. The hospital relied on the generallimita-
tions period, MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984), which provides 
that "[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it ac-
crues." The determination of the accrual date has been left to the courts. See Gold-
stein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684, 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1979). 
Because the hospital treated Ms. Levy prior to July 1, 1976, the hospital could not 
raise MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984), which modified the limi-
tations period for health care providers to "require claims be filed (1) within five 
years of the time the injury was committed or (2) within three years of the date 
when the injury was discovered, whichever is the shorter." 
9. Lutheran Hosp. v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 288,487 A.2d 292 (1985). 
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the limitations period accrues from the date a person gains actual knowl-
edge of circumstances that should have put a "person of ordinary pru-
dence on inquiry."10 The court thus barred the claim,1I finding that the 
plaintiff gained actual knowledge of her injury more than three years 
before the action was brought. 12 
Statutes of limitations involving personal injury actions J3 developed 
in seventeenth century Britain to bar inconsequential suits from the 
king's court.14 The American colonies utilized the statutes to protect 
against frivolous claims supported by lost evidence, faded memories, and 
dead witnesses. ls Although the limitations period was disfavored by 
some courts l6 because the arbitrary period worked to deprive just claims, 
statutes of limitations gained popularity as an effective method of 
preventing stale actions. 17 
At first, Maryland followed the rule that the limitations period is 
strictly construed,ls accruing from the time the tort is committed l9 un-
10. [d. at 233, 482 A.2d at 25. The court rejected the trial judge's holding that the 
statute of limitations did not begin to run until a reasonable investigatory period of 
six months from the time when Ms. Levy first became suspicious of the treatment. 
[d. at 237, 482 A.2d at 27. 
II. [d. at 244, 482 A.2d at 31. 
12. [d. at 238, 482 A.2d at 28. The court held the limitations period accrued from the 
date of the plaintiff's visit to Dr. Wiedmann at Mercy Hospital in 1974. The claim 
was not brought within three years of that date; therefore, the suit was barred by 
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984). The court found the defend-
ant hospital negligent in failing to produce the x-rays, but the plaintiff did not meet 
the burden of proving fraudulent intent, a necessary element of fraudulent conceal-
ment and equitable estoppel and the recognized exception to a statute of limitations 
defense. [d. at 241, 482 A.2d at 30. Further, because the plaintiff was slow in pur-
suing her claim, equity could not provide an extension. [d. 
13. W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES 9-10 (1978). 
Prior to 1623, the maxim "actio personalis moritorium persona," a personal action 
dies with the person, was the only time limitation on bringing an action in tort. 
Statutes of limitation relating to real property, however, "may be traced to ancient 
Greece or beyond and through numerous societies that developed in the ancient 
world." [d. at 7. 
14. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1I77, 1I78 
(1950) (citing the Limitation Act of 1623, 21 Jac. I, c. 23 (1623)). 
15. W. FERGUSON, supra note 13, at 47; see also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) ("The foundation of the acquisition of rights by 
lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the person who gains them, not in 
that of the loser. . .. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a 
long time whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be 
tom away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you 
came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of 
man"). 
16. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 
7 (1916). 
17. [d. at 9. 
18. Ruff v. Bull, 7 H. & J. II, 12 (1825). 
19. Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 301, 308-09 (1850) ("as soon as the cause of action 
accrued ... the Statute of Limitations begins to run"); see also Hahn v. Claybrook, 
130 Md. 178, 182, 100 A. 83, 84 (1917) ("the cause of action accrues and the statute 
begins to run from the time of the breach or neglect, not from the time when conse-
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less the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to delay filing suit. 20 For 
example, if the defendant concealed from the plaintiff the elements neces-
sary to provide notice of the cause of action, courts extended the limita-
tions period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud. 21 
Also, when a plaintiff, in good faith, relied upon unconscionable acts of 
the defendant, equity prevented the defendant from asserting limitations 
as a defense. 22 
In medical malpractice actions, the policy of protecting the physi-
cian from stale claims conflicts with the policy of shielding innocent par-
ties from the loss of a claim because of the hidden nature of an injury.23 
The "time of the tort" rule24 resulted in many negligently treated pa-
tients losing their cause of action before an injury25 was prominent.26 To 
quential damages result or become ascertained; for the cause of action is founded on 
the breach of duty"). 
20. See H. WOOD, supra note 16, at 1358. 
21. The fraudulent concealment exception is codified in MD. Crs. & JUD. PRoe. CODE 
ANN. § 5-203 (1984) which provides, "[if] a party is kept in ignorance ofa cause of 
action by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be deemed to 
accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary dili-
gence should have discovered the fraud." See Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md. 257, 267-68 
(1877) (a party practicing fraud may not plead the statute); see also Herring v. Of-
futt, 266 Md. 593, 295 A.2d 876 (1972) (where confidential relationship exists, the 
confiding party's failure to discover the facts constituting fraud may be excused). 
The intent element of fraud is difficult to prove, see Consolidated Public Utilities 
Co. v. Baile, 152 Md. 371, 136 A. 825 (1927) (defendant's refusal to admit liability 
not fraudulent), and the plaintiff must also prove the acts constituting ordinary dili-
gence, Piper v. Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955). 
22. 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (1941). Although 
Maryland recognizes the power of equity to estop a limitations defense, Johns Hop-
kins Hosp. v. Lehringer, 48 Md. App. 549, 562, 429 A.2d 538, 545, cert. denied, 290 
Md. 717 (1981), no cases to date have been determined on that ground. See, e.g., 
Nyitrai v. Bonis, 266 Md. 295, 292 A.2d 642 (1972) (settlement negotiations not 
sufficient to extend statutory period); Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 289 A.2d 
1 (1972) (erroneous legal position of accountant not sufficient to delay accrual of 
malpractice limitations period); Pearre v. Grossnickle, 139 Md. I, 114 A. 725 (1921) 
(party must be blameworthy of some unconscientious, inequitable, or fraudulent act 
of commission or omission). 
23. See Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983) (bal-
ancing competing interests in latent asbestosis disease case); see also Note, Limita-
tions in Professional Malpractice Actions, 28 MD. L. REV. 47, 49 (1968) ("patients 
and clients ought to be protected from tortious acts which are often of such a nature 
that their discovery is improbable within the statutory period"). See generally An-
not., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 372 (1958 & Supp. 1985) (discussion of limitations in medi-
cal malpractice actions). 
24. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
25. See Furlong v. O'Hearne, 144 F. Supp. 266 (D. Md. 1956), which stated that "the 
word 'injury', as applied to a personal injury to a human being, includes whatever 
lesion or change in any part of the system produces harm or pain or a lessened 
facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capability." Id. at 270 (citation 
omitted.); see also H. MANN, MEDICAL ASSESSMENT OF INJURIES II (3d ed. 1979) 
("injury to human body occurs when there is evidence of deterioration in function, 
either temporarily or permanently, as the result of one or more particular physical 
injuries, impositions of mental strain, or exposures to unsatisfactory occupational 
situations"). See generally 43A C.J.S. Injury § 2 (1955) (defines injury as "a 
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protect these victims, courts developed two rules that extended the statu-
tory period. 
The first rule adopted by courts seeking to avoid the harsh effect of 
the time of the tort rule was the "termination of treatment" rule. 27 This 
rule provided that each day the physician failed to remedy a prior negli-
gent act, such as removing a sponge,28 constituted a new breach that was 
actionable.29 The rule was limited, however, because a patient who did 
not return to the negligent physician could not extend the limitations 
period. 30 
The second rule adopted by courts was the "discovery" rule. This 
rule provides the most protection to injured parties and delays the run-
ning of the statutory clock until the date the injury is discovered.31 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Hahn v. Claybrook,32 was the first in 
the nation to hold that a patient's cause of action accrued only after the 
injury is known to the patient.33 This break with the time of the tort rule 
wrongful invasion of legal rights, and is not concerned with the hurt or damage 
resulting from such invasion"). 
26. See, e.g., Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) (limitation period ac-
crues from the time physician negligently failed to remove sponge from patient's 
arm); Conklin v. Draper, 229 A.D. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, (limitations period accrued 
from the time pair of arterial forceps left in body following appendectomy), aff'd 
mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); Connor v. Schenck, 240 N.C. 794, 84 
S.E.2d 175 (1954) (limitations period commenced from date broken ankle was im-
properly set). 
27. See Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdic-
tions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 340-43 (1962). 
28. See, e.g., Budoff v. Kessler, 284 A.D. 1049, 135 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1954) (dentist's drill 
imbedded in tooth); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) (nee-
dle left in body); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106,65 N.E. 865 (1902) (physician 
left sponge in patient's stomach). 
29. See Waldman v. Rohrbough, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966) (dictum); see also, 
Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919) (primary reason for rule is a 
preference not to harass doctors prematurely by patients who institute law suits 
merely to preserve their right of action). But see Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 
700,501 A.2d 27,32 (1985) (termination of treatment rule was abrogated by statu-
tory discovery rule of MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-109). 
30. See Strong v. Pontiac General Hosp., 117 Mich. App. 143, 151,323 N.W.2d 629, 
632 (1982) (treating physician's referral of patient to another physician in same pro-
fessional corporation held sufficient to delay statute from tolling); see also DeGrazia 
v. Johnson, 105 Mich. App. 356, 360, 306 N.W.2d 512, 514 (1981) (telephone con-
versation held sufficient to extend statutory period). 
31. See Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St. 3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 438 
(1983) (Ohio replaced termination of treatment rule with discovery rule, stating, "in 
balancing the equities between doctor and patient, the burden placed on the doctor 
is much less than the greater injustice the patient would suffer."). [d. at 114, 449 
N.E.2d at 441. 
32. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917). 
33. [d. The court found that the statutory period did not accrue until the time that the 
plaintiff complained to her husband of discoloration due to the zinc oxide prescrip-
tion. [d. at 186, 100 A. at 87; see Note, Poffenberger v. Risser-The Discovery Prin-
ciple is the Rule, not the Exception, 41 MD. L. REV. 451, 456-7 (1982) (citing Note, 
The Statute of Limitations in Actions/or Undiscovered Malpractice, 12 WYo. L.J. 30, 
34 (1957». 
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was adopted by several jurisdictions,34 but paradoxically was not applied 
again in a medical malpractice case by a Maryland court for nearly fifty 
years.35 In Waldman v. Rohrbaugh,36 the Hahn reasoning was resur-
rected when the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a medical mal-
practice action accrues when the patient knows or should have known he 
has suffered injury or damage. 37 The determinative issue in a discovery 
rule jurisdiction therefore became what constituted notice of the injury 
or damage to a potential plaintiff. 38 Defendants argued that any trivial 
manifestation of the injury was sufficient notice,39 while plaintiffs claimed 
that notice did not occur until the plaintiff had knowledge of all the es-
sential elements of the cause of action.40 
34. See Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957); Greenock v. Rush 
Presbyterian St. Lukes Medical Center, 65 I1l. App. 3d 266,382 N.E.2d 321 (1978); 
Thomas v. Lobranzo, 76 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 1954); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 
603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); 
McFarland v. Conally, 252 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). The discovery rule 
applied in medical malpractice cases is the majority rule. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 
368-414 (1958 & Supp. 1985). 
35. The Hahn court probably created the confusion by citing as controlling Young v. 
Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 301 (1850), a case that stood for the general time of the tort 
rule. See Hahn, 130 Md. 179, 182, 100 A. 83, 84 (1917). One court mistakenly 
followed this dicta to bar an action. See Picket v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 
1940) (limitations period held to have accrued from date sponge negligently left in 
body). The discovery exception was used occasionally in nonmalpractice cases. See 
Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md. 520, 41 A.2d 473 (1945) (faulty construction of re-
taining wall); see also Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449, 452 (D. 
Md. 1962) (stating that Hahn created a discovery exception); Jackson v. United 
States, 182 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1960) (cause of action accrued when patient 
noticed physical effects of needle left in body). See generally Note, Poffenberger v. 
Risser, supra note 33, at 458 (tracing history of limitations in Maryland). 
36. 241 Md. 137,215 A.2d 825 (1966). 
37. Id. at 142, 215 A.2d at 826. The physician was sued for negligent treatment of an 
ankle. The court, after an extensive review of authorities, cited Hahn and allowed 
the claim in light of the discovery rule. The court, however, left the door open for 
the termination of treatment rule. Id. at 145, 215 A.2d at 830. Shortly thereafter, 
the discovery exception was applied in all professional malpractice cases in Mary-
land. See, e.g., Leonhart v. Atkinson, 265 Md. 219, 289 A.2d 1 (1972) (discovery 
rule applies to all professional malpractice actions); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 
288,257 A.2d 421 (1969) (accountants); Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 
Md. 440, 258 A.2d 177 (1969) (architects); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 
254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969) (attorneys). 
38. See Poffenberger v. Risser, 46 Md. App. 600, 601, 421 A.2d 90, 91 (1980) ("It is 
generally known in Maryland that for the most part a statutory bar will fall after 
three years. The real problem is three years from when."), rev'd, 290 Md. 631, 431 
A.2d 677 (1981). 
39. See, e.g., Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288, 257 A.2d 421 (1969) (limitations for 
malpractice against accountant accrues when plaintiff receives notice of tax defi-
ciency); Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88,253 A.2d 904 (1969) (limitations period 
against civil engineering firm accrues when plaintiff notices discrepancy in the plac-
ing of boundary markers); see also Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 
449 (D. Md. 1962) (limitations period commences from the first time trivial injuries 
are noted). 
40. See, e.g., Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d 1020, 
1026-27 (1983) (limitations period for lung cancer arising out of exposure to asbes-
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In Poffenberger v. Risser,41 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ex-
tended the discovery rule to all civil actions and held that notice required 
actual knowledge.42 According to Poffenberger, actual notice could be 
satisfied either by direct information communicated to the party, or the 
existence of circumstances that should lead a diligent party to the knowl-
edge of a principal fact.43 
The breadth of the Poffenberger decision44 raised several issues con-
cerning determination of actual notice. First, it was unclear whether the 
determination of what constituted "direct information communicated to 
a party" and "ordinary diligence" would be factual issues for the jury.45 
Second, it was unclear whether the plaintiff had a burden to show that 
the injury could not have been discovered within the requisite three year 
period, or whether it was the defendant's responsibility to put actual no-
tice in issue when answering the complaint.46 Third, when the Pof-
tos accrues when plaintiff has a reasonable probability to discover damages); Gold-
stein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 404 A.2d 1064 (1979) (limitations 
period for nuisance runs from the date the plaintiff could have proved the essential 
elements of his action, including damages); James V. Weisheit, 279 Md. 41, 44, 367 
A.2d 482,484 (1977) (citing W. B. & A. Elec. R.R. Co. v. Moss, 130 Md. 198,205, 
100 A. 86, 89 (1917» (The test to be utilized in fixing the accrual date "is to ascer-
tain the time when plaintiff could have first maintained his action to a successful 
result. The fact that he might have brought a premature or groundless action is 
immaterial. "). 
41. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981). 
42. Id. at 637, 431 A.2d at 680. Poffenberger was a civil action over a boundary dispute 
between two neighbors. The defendant argued that the land records provided con-
structive knowledge of the defect to the plaintiff and because the defect was re-
corded for more than three years the claim should be barred. The court of special 
appeals affirmed the finding for defendant, refusing to extend the discovery rule 
beyond malpractice cases. Poffenberger, 46 Md. App. 600, 421 A.2d 90 (1980), 
rev'd, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981). The court of appeals reversed, extending 
the discovery rule to all civil actions because the policies of repose and administra-
tive expediency underlying the statute were outweighed by injustice to the plaintiff. 
Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680. 
43. Id. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681. 
44. Id. at 639, 431 A.2d at 681. (Rodowsky, J. concurring) ("because every legal rela-
tionship in society gives rise to rights and obligations, and thereby potential litiga-
tion, it is impossible to foresee the types, volumes and merits of claims which will 
hereafter present the assertion that the claimant reasonably did not know of the 
facts compromising each of the traditionally constituent elements of the alleged 
wrong within three years after they occurred"). 
45. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md. App. 619,484 A.2d 275 (1984), rev'd, 305 Md. 280, 
301 A.2d 1313 (1986) (questions offact on which a limitations defense will turn are 
to be decided by the jury). In O'Hara, the court of special appeals found that "limi-
tations is still a matter for the judge rather than the jury even if the facts concerning 
discovery are disputed." /d. at 629, 484 A.2d at 280. The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that Poffenberger ruled that notice, if contraverted, was an ultimate fact 
going to the merits of the claim, and if controverted it could not be the proper 
subject of a summary judgment. O'Hara, 305 Md. at 295, 501 A.2d at 1321. 
46. Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 241,469 A.2d 867, 893 (1984) 
("the burden is on the Plaintiffs to prove that they did not discover the alleged 
wrong more than three years before they filed suit and that this lack of discovery 
was not due to Plaintiffs' unreasonable failure to exercise ordinary diligence"). 
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fenberger court stated that actual notice charged a party with notice of 
all facts that an investigation would reveal,47 it was unclear whether an 
additional investigatory period to gain those facts was contemplated.48 
Moreover, it was uncertain whether Poffenberger threatened to negate 
the common law extension of fraudulent concealment49 by its holding 
that the acts of the defendant were immaterial to the accrual date. 50 
These actual notice issues quickly rose to the appellate level, where 
the courts braced for the flood of post-Poffenberger appealsY Resolving 
some of these issues,52 the courts placed the burden of proving actual 
notice on the plaintiff,53 and held that the trial judge had no authority to 
decide factual issues in a limitations case. 54 
Lutheran Hospital v. Levy 55 was the first case in which the court of 
special appeals applied Poffenberger's actual notice analysis to a medical 
malpractice case, the type of case in which the discovery rule 
originated. 56 In Lutheran Hospital,57 the court held that the statute of 
limitations begins to accrue from the date that a patient gains actual 
47. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 637, 431 A.2d at 681 (citing Feritta v. Bay Shore Dev. 
Corp., 252 Md. 393, 250 A.2d 69 (1969». 
48. See Lutheran Hosp. v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227,482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 288,487 A.2d 292 (1985); O'Hara V. Kovens, 60 Md. App. 619,484 A.2d 275 
(1984) (investigation of United States attorney into defendant's fraud did not allow 
an additional inquiry period), rev'd, 305 Md. 280, 501 A.2d 1313 (1986). 
49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
SO. Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 640, 431 A.2d at 682 (Rodowsky, J., concurring) ("The 
fact that the failure to discover the alleged wrong was due in no way to the defend-
ant's fraud will seemingly be immaterial in many, if not most, civil actions at law."); 
see also Note, Poffenberger v. Risser, supra note 33, at 455 n.36 ("It seems likely ... 
that the general application of the discovery rule will render § 5-203 immaterial in 
many, if not most, civil actions at law."). 
51. Johnson v. Nadwodny, 55 Md. App. 227, 233, 461 A.2d 67, 70-71 (1983) ("[I]n 
light of the predictable influx of post-Poffenberger cases ... we are faced with the 
deluge which appears to have commenced"). In Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983), the court of appeals granted certiorari 
before argument at the court of special appeals and applied Poffenberger to extend 
the limitations period in asbestos-caused lung cancer cases until the date the lung 
cancer was discovered, despite the finding that the plaintiff was on notice of the 
related disease of asbestosis earlier. Id. at 464 A.2d at 1027. 
52. See Lutheran Hosp. v. Levy, 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984) (discovery rule 
does not contemplate additional inquiry investigation period), cert. denied, 302 Md. 
288, 487 A.2d 292 (1985). Finch V. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 469 
A.2d 867 (burden of proving ordinary diligence is on plaintiff), cert. denied, 300 Md. 
88, 475 A.2d 120 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1190 (1985); Johnson V. 
Nadwodny, 55 Md. App. 227,461 A.2d 67 (1983) (test of ordinary diligence paral-
lels the Poffenberger implied knowledge test). 
53. Finch V. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, cert. denied, 300 
Md. 88,475 A.2d 120 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1190 (1985). 
54. O'Hara V. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 301 A.2d 1313 (1986); see supra note 45 and ac-
companying text. 
55. 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 
(1985). 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
57. 60 Md. App. 227, 482 A.2d 23 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 
(1985). 
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knowledge of facts sufficient to raise an inquiry as to injury. 58 The trial 
court had determined that an additional six month inquiry period was 
available from the date when the plaintiff first became suspicious of the 
injurious treatment. 59 The Lutheran court rejected that analysis, finding 
that the facts that raised the suspicion were also sufficient to constitute 
actual notice. 6O The court further found that actual notice of the under-
lying facts of a cause of action, and not the legal conclusions drawn 
therefrom, begins the accrual of the limitations period.61 Because the 
patient in Lutheran Hospital was aware of all the facts necessary to her 
claim in 1974, and could not demonstrate any inequitable conduct on the 
part of the defendant, her claim was barred.62 The court recognized the 
harsh effect that this ruling had on the plaintiff, but concluded that the 
public policy of protecting interests in repose compelled the holding. 63 
The Lutheran decision provides the Maryland practitioner with in-
sightful analysis on the determination of actual notice as defined by Pof-
fenberger. 64 The Poffenberger court, by its general rejection of the time 
of the tort rule in civil actions, may have contemplated that the discovery 
rule would be liberally construed to prevent a strict interpretation of the 
limitation period from harming innocent plaintiffs.65 As evidenced by the 
Lutheran decision, however, the actual notice element of the discovery 
rule can be seized by the defendant to dispose quickly of stale claims. 
58. [d. at 237, 482 A.2d at 27. 
59. [d. at 235, 482 A.2d at 26. 
60. [d. at 235-36, 482 A.2d at 26-27. 
61. [d. at 239-40, 482 A.2d at 29. 
62. [d. at 243-44, 482 A.2d at 31. 
63. [d. The court quoted from Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 
(1945), which stated that "[S]tatutes of limitation find their justification in necessity 
and convenience rather than logic. They represent expedience, rather than princi-
ples." The court noted that Ms. Levy learned that "access to our system of justice is 
not always easy for the impecunious." Lutheran Hosp., 60 Md. App. at 236, 482 
A.2d at 27. 
64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra note 42; see also Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656,667-
68, 464 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1983) ("the partial infringement of the right to repose is 
far outweighed by the unfairness of barring a reasonably diligent person from recov-
ery for a latent disease. "). 
The practitioner should, however, be aware that the court of appeals in O'Hara 
v. Kovens, 60 Md. App. 619, 484 A.2d 275 (1984), rev'd, 305 Md. 280, 297-98, 503 
A.2d 1313, 1321-22 (1986), distinguished between pre- and post-Poffenberger cases. 
305 Md. at 297, 298, 503 A.2d at 1321-22. Because Poffenberger radically changed 
the limitations defense, counsel should examine pre-Poffenberger cases carefully to 
insure that they were not reversed. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md. App. 619, 484 
A.2d 275 (1984), rev'd, 305 Md. 280, 503 A.2d 1313 (1986) (holding that the limita-
tions period, if controverted, is a jury issue; this case reversed two pre-Poffenberger 
cases, Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202,422 A.2d 389 (1980), cert. denied, 289 Md. 
735 (1981) and May v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 364,416 A.2d 289 (1980), both of which 
held that statutes of limitations are strictly legal questions); see also, Hill v. Fitzger-
ald, 304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985) (holding that in medical malpractice actions, 
the termination of treatment exception of Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 
215 A.2d 825 (1966) has been abrogated by the discovery rule). 
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The court's rejection of a preliminary investigatory period reflects 
judicial reluctance to expand the discovery rule.66 Had the trial judge's 
finding that a preliminary investigatory period existed been upheld, it 
would have opened a "Pandora's box." A judicial determination of what 
constitutes a "reasonable investigation period" necessarily would depend 
on such varied factors as the capacity of the patient to investigate,67 the 
injury to be investigated,68 and other sUbjective determinations.69 The 
resulting confusion as to the accrual dates of actions, because similar 
negligent acts resulting in similar injuries could have differing investiga-
tory periods, would undermine a litigant's determination of liability.70 
The Lutheran holding that notice of facts raising inquiry equals actual 
notice avoids subjective determinations and promotes stability in accrual 
dates. 71 
The medical malpractice practitioner, however, should be wary of 
the court's assertion that the discovery rule places medical malpractice 
patients on a par with the "normal" automobile accident victim.72 In a 
"normal" automobile accident case, the victim is on actual notice due to 
the event itself; 73 the accident contains all the facts necessary to support 
a cause of action. To the extent that the patient expressly learns of the 
prior negligent act,74 the court is correct in its assertion that both classes 
of tort victims are treated equally. Medical malpractice injuries, how-
ever, often are not so readily apparent following negligent treatment, 
66. This is in accord with the general rule that statutes of limitations are to be strictly 
construed. Decker v. Fink, 47 Md. App. 202,422 A.2d 389 (1980). 
67. See, e.g., Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 495 P.2d 969 (1972) (patient claimed 
that she was unable by reason of mental illness to ascertain the fact of her injury); 
Castrillo v. Stimulation Technology Inc., 393 So.2d 772 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (patient 
had only a 6th grade education and understood only limited English); Silverman v. 
Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 403 A.2d 18 (1979) (patient had a master's degree 
and was research director of a drug manufacturer). 
68. Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 749 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1984) (alleged carcinogenic 
amounts of benzidine applied to criminal suspect's hand four years earlier to test for 
presence of blood); Toal v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 1063 (D.C. Conn. 1969) 
(radioactive contrast material left in body eventually traveled to brain, causing 
arachroiditis). 
69. Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (drug induced mental 
impairment of patient by psychiatrist prevented patient from understanding causal 
relation of malpractice and her condition); Petri v. Smith, 307 Pa. Super. 261, 453 
A.2d 342 (1982) (religious beliefs of patient were a reasonable ground for her failure 
to investigate). 
70. See, Note, Poffenberger v. Risser, supra note 33, at 459 ("Our judicial system is 
based on the principle that like cases should be treated alike. Thus all plaintiffs 
arguably should receive the same consideration in statute of limitations cases."). 
71. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 238, 482 A.2d at 28. 
72. /d. 
73. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972) (accident as a result 
of violation of "boulevard rule"); Brooks v. Fairman, 253 Md. 471, 252 A.2d 865 
(1968) (rear-end collision); Board of County Comm'rs v. Dorcus, 247 Md. 251, 230 
A.2d 656 (1967) (failure to drive on right half of the roadway). 
74. See infra notes 83-87. 
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thus separating the cause-the treatment-from the effect-the injury.75 
Further, a medical patient is often told to expect some residual pain76 
and therefore may not attribute the pain to a wrong.77 Despite a patient's 
sUbjective belief, actual notice may be implied if a reasonable person 
would have inquired a~ '~O the pain.78 The court's analogy, therefore, is 
unsatisfactory because ,\ fails to make the necessary distinction between 
express knowledge and implied actual notice. 79 
The Lutheran decision is a primer for Maryland practitioners on 
actual notice.80 Fundamentally, counsel should remember Lutheran 
teaches that notice of the facts, and not the legal conclusions drawn 
therefrom, begins the statutory clock81 A claim that a party lacked ac-
tual notice because he had not sought legal advice will be unpersuasive. 
As the Lutheran court found, delaying the accrual date until the attorney 
or expert has rendered an opinion would extend unreasonably a defend-
75, See, e,g., Yoshizaki v, Hilo Hosp" 50 Haw, 150,433 P,2d 220 (1967) (radiation 
treatment-radiation burns); Dobbins v, Clifford, 39 A,D,2d 1, 330 N,YS,2d 743 
(1972) (spleen removal---damage to pancreas); Witherell v, Weimer, 77 III. App, 3d 
582,396 N.E.2d 268 (1979) (prescription of birth control pills - thrombophlebitis), 
Cj Horig v, Johns-Manville Sales Corp" 284 Md, 70, 394 A,2d 299 (1978) (asbestos 
exposure--cancer ), 
76, See 2 LAWYERS MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 9A33 (1979) (following a fractured bone, 
"a few weeks or months may be necessary to determine whether nerve function is 
returning"), 
77, Indeed, this may be one reason why Ms, Levy waited three months before consult-
ing another physician, even though her ankle continued to hurt after the discharge 
from the hospital. Lutheran Hosp" 60 Md, App, at 233, 482 A,2d at 25, 
78, Poffenberger, 290 Md, at 636-37, 431 A.2d at 680 (citing Baltimore v, Whittington, 
78 Md, 231, 27 A, 984 (1893», In addition, unless reasonable men could not differ 
as to what constituted actual notice, the question will be for the trier of fact. 
O'Hara v, Kovens, 305 Md, 280, 301, 503 A,2d 1313, 1324 (1986), 
79, Although the Lutheran Hosp, court strives to place both victims on an equal 
ground, this is contrary to the general policy in Maryland of restricting rights of 
medical malpractice claimants to bring an action, See MD, CTS, & JUD, PROC, 
CODE ANN, § 5-109 (1984) (five year mandatory period in which to bring action, or 
three years from date of discovery, whichever is shorter), 
In Hill v, Fitzgerald, 304 Md, 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland determined on a certified question from federal court that the restriction 
on medical malpractice claims did not violate equal protection, The court stated 
that "an imposition of a mandatory time bar represents, we think, a fair balance, 
permitting the state to further a legitimate purpose while affording protection to 
individuals who sustain injuries by reason of medical malpractice," [d, at 703, 501 
A.2d at 34. 
80. Actual notice was recently made a jury issue in O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md, App, 
619, 484 A.2d 275 (1984), rev'd, 305 Md. 280, 503 A,2d 1313 (1986) (affirming 
intermediate court determination that mental disability of a plaintiff delayed the 
statutory period), In O'Hara, the court reversed cases that held that actual notice 
was a question of law. See May v. Bell, 46 Md. App, 364, 416 A,2d 289, cert. 
denied, 288 Md, 740 (1980); Jones v, Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973). 
The court determined that actual notice of the cause of action was a jury issue, 
O'Hara, 305 Md. at 299, 503 A,2d at 1323, Actual notice is a jury issue; therefore, 
practitioners should pay careful attention to factors discussed in Lutheran Hasp, 
that indicate when a person had "reason to know" of a claim. 
8!. Luthern Hosp., 60 Md. App, at 239-40, 482 A.2d at 29. 
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ant's exposure to liability and would undermine the protected interests in 
repose. 82 
In determining whether a patient has actual notice, the Lutheran 
court gives critical importance to the statements made by the physi-
cian.83 Lutheran suggests that any statement indicating the existence of 
malpractice will constitute actual notice if that statement would lead a 
reasonable person of ordinary diligence to investigate.84 Although ex-
press statements of a physician regarding malpractice always raises "rea-
sonable doubt,"85 it is unclear whether the opinion of a person without 
medical expertise would be sufficient to raise this issue.86 Hence, practi-
tioners should be watchful for any express statements in a discovery case, 
especially at the deposition stage, because a revealing statement may be 
the basis for a summary judgment motion.87 
The question of actual notice also may turn on the ability of the 
patient to discover the injury. Although the tort maxim "take the plain-
tiff as you find him"88 usually disadvantages the defendant, in a discovery 
case it may benefit the defendant if a plaintiff, skilled in medicine, is held 
to a heightened duty to discover the injury.89 Consequently, in question-
ing a plaintiff, either at an interview or through a discovery device, coun-
sel should probe for information concerning education, employment, or 
other circumstances that indicate the plaintiff had "reason to know."90 
The Lutheran decision also demonstrates the vestigial nature of the 
fraudulent concealment exception.91 At common law, the concealment 
82. See Note, Poffenberger v. Risser, supra note 33, at 459-60 (suggesting that addi-
tional cost of retaining records for a longer period of time, locating missing wit-
nesses, and increasing insurance premiums result when the limitations period is 
extended). 
83. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 233, 482 A.2d at 25. 
84. [d. at 237, 482 A.2d at 27 (citing Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 637-38, 431 A.2d at 677). 
85. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 233, 482 A.2d at 25. The court further reasoned 
that "[E]ven though the 'wrong' she thought then existed (being told to walk on the 
ankle) was not the 'wrong' ultimately established (improper casting), she believed a 
'wrong' had occurred." [d. 
86. O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 302, 503 A.2d 1313, 1324 (1986) ("Notice is not 
limited to actual knowledge. . . . Nor does it mean discovery of proof which, if 
believed, would, in the opinion of counsel, take the case to the jury on the merits. It 
is not limited to admissible evidence."). 
87. Lutheran Hosp., 60 Md. App. at 236, 482 A.2d at 27. Ms. Levy revealed the state-
ments during a deposition. For a summary of limitations tactics during depositions, 
see Cuker, The Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Cases: A Guide, 51 
PENN. BAR Assoc. Q. 132, 136-37 (1980). Summary judgment in limitations cases 
are guided by the ordinary principle that there must be no dispute as to a material 
fact. O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 304, 503 A.2d 1313, 1325 (1986). 
88. See Peterson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 254 Md. 137,254 A.2d 198 (1969). 
89. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 236, 482 A.2d at 27; see also Iones v. Suger, 18 Md. 
App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973) (registered nurse held to higher standard); Silverman 
v. Lathrop, 168 N.I. Super. 333,403 A.2d 18 (1979) (patient who had a master's 
degree and was research director of a drug manufacturer was held to higher 
standard). 
90. See Cuker, supra note 87, at 136. 
91. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 640, 431 A.2d 677, 682 (1981) (Rodowsky, I., 
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exception extended the limitations period in cases of fraud until the 
plaintiff gained actual knowledge of the fraud or injury.92 The Pof-
fenberger discovery rule focuses similarly on the point in time when the 
plaintiff gains actual knowledge of the injury.93 The actions of the de-
fendant are immaterial under the discovery rule, thus making the fraudu-
lent concealment exception useless.94 The legislature should therefore 
either eliminate the fraudulent concealment exception, or modify it to 
distinguish the exception from the rule. 
To prevent the barring of claims similar to the one in Lutheran, the 
statute should be modified. In Lutheran, the court conceded that the x-
rays the hospital failed to produce for over two years were of fundamen-
tal importance, yet the court refused to extend the statutory period be-
cause there was no proof that the failure to produce was an intentional 
act.95 By requiring an intentional act, defendants have little incentive to 
provide efficient record keeping because the increased cost may be out-
weighed by the benefits of delaying a civil action.96 The legislature 
should consider broadening the concealment exception to freeze the stat-
utory period during the time the defendant's acts prejudice the plaintiff.97 
Under a broad prejudice test, defendants would not benefit from their 
concurring) ("that the failure to discover the alleged wrong was due in no way to 
the defendants fraud will seemingly be immaterial in many, if not most, civil actions 
at law"). An argument can be made that the fraudulent concealment exception will 
extend the time for filing a claim beyond the mandatory five year period of MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109, but there is no reference in that section to 
any exceptions, nor have any cases been tried on that point. In Hill v. Fitzgerald, 
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985), the court of appeals found that § 5-109 "must be 
calculated in accordance with the literal language," and that the.five year maximum 
period runs "without regard to whether the injury was reasonably discovered or 
not." Id. at 703, 501 A.2d at 34. 
92. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
93. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 242, 482 A.2d at 30. 
94. Poffenberger v.Risser, 290 Md. 631, 640,431 A.2d 677,682 (1981) (Rodowsky, J., 
concurring). 
95. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 242, 482 A.2d at 30; see alsa Johns Hopkins Hosp. 
v. Lehninger, 48 Md. App. 549, 429 A.2d 538 (1981) (limitations defense can be 
barred only by a defendant's fraud, or conduct tantamount to a constructive fraud). 
96. Lutheran Hasp., 60 Md. App. at 243, 482 A.2d at 30. 
97. Federal law provides a model to which the legislature should refer. As in Maryland, 
the Federal Employer's Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) provides that "no action shall be 
maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day 
the cause of action accrued." 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1948). Similarly, the F.E.L.A. has 
adopted the discovery rule. Emmons v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 
1112 (5th Cir. 1983). Unlike Maryland, however, F.E.L.A. courts allow an exten-
sion of time to file a claim absent a showing of actual fraud or fraudulent intent, so 
long as the misrepresentations or actions of the defendant justifiably misled the 
plaintiff. See Benson v. Milwaukee R.R., 353 F. Supp. 889, 890 (E.D. Wisc. 1973), 
Tillery v. Southern Ry. Co., 348 F. Supp. 9 (D.C. Tenn. 1971). At least one federal 
court has required ~he plaintiff to prove his diligence. Holifield v. Cities Service 
Tanker Corp., 421 F. Supp. 131 (delay of two years and eleven months held to bar a 
claim where the plaintiff's diligence was not proven), aff'd, 522 F.2d 367 (1976). In 
Lutheran Hasp., because the plaintiff did not make a second request for the x-rays 
for nearly two years, any justifiable reliance she may have had on their nonproduc-
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own negligence. The plaintiff, however, still would bear the burden of 
pleading the prejudicial act and proving how it kept him in ignorance of 
the cause of action.98 
The discovery rule applied to medical malpractice actions is not a 
new concept in Maryland law.99 The sweeping changes of Poffenberger, 
however, generated new issues concerning the determination of what 
constitutes actual notice. IOO In Lutheran, the court of special appeals 
provides practitioners with a comprehensive guide to determine actual 
notice under the Poffenberger discovery rule. As Lutheran demonstrates, 
the court is unwilling to engraft additional preliminary investigation peri-
ods to determine actual notice, even in cases of hardship, because that 
would undermine the policies of certainty and repose protected by the 
statute.101 The Lutheran decision should be considered carefully by med-
ical malpractice litigators because the application of the factors stressed, 
such as express statements, personal knowledge, perception of the injury, 
and ordinary diligence, will determine if the privilege to litigate is pre-
served or lost. 
Edward T. Pinder 
tion would probably be outweighed by her lack of diligence. See Luthern Hasp., 60 
Md. App. at 243, 482 A.2d at 26. 
98. Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Lehninger, 48 Md. App. 549, 562, 429 A.2d 538, 545 
(1981); see also Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190,241-42,469 A.2d 
867,893 (1984) (burden of proof in both discovery and fraudulent concealment is on 
the plaintiff). 
99. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. 
10 1. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
